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1 Introduction
On June 6th 1978, voters in California passed Proposition 13, slashing property
taxes. Proposition 13 was a citizen’s ballot initiative sponsored by the larger-
than-life Howard Jarvis (slogan: “I’m mad as hell, and I’m not going to take it
any more!”) By the general election in November that year there were similar
measures on the ballot in 13 US states. Many were “initiative states” which, like
California, allow their citizens to propose legislation to the voters directly. But
states without the ballot initiative were also affected. Legislators in Texas and
Hawaii brought tax-capping constitutional amendments before the voters; Jarvis
traveled to Texas to rally support. A special session of the Alabama legislature
proposed ceilings on property taxes which were passed by the voters. In Nebraska
the legislature enacted a statutory property tax cap. In Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, the legislature considered but did
not pass tax limitations. Several other states took relatively minor actions such as
establishing a commission to examine property taxes (Hawkins 1979, ACIR 1979).
Whether or not Proposition 13 helped bring Reagan to power, as some argue
(Kirlin 1982; see Smith 1998), it certainly affected legislative behaviour in states
across the US, even in those which lacked direct democratic institutions.
In 2005, two Californian ballot initiatives sought to reduce the cost of pre-
scription drugs for low-income families. Proposition 79 was supported by citizens’
groups and organized labour. It mandated the Department of Health Services to
negotiate collective discounts on drug prices with pharmaceutical companies;
uncooperative companies could be shut out of the state Medi-Cal program.
Proposition 78 was sponsored by the drug companies. It covered fewer families
and contained no penalties for non-participators. The competition between these
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two propositions was intense and acrimonious. Advocates for either side pointed
to evidence from similar recent programmes in Maine and Ohio. The Maine legis-
lature had originally developed “Maine Rx” in 2000. This plan, like Proposition
79, allowed non-participating drug companies to be barred from Maine’s Medicaid
programme. Maine Rx had been struck down by the courts and in 2003 a volun-
tary, compromise system was in place. In Ohio, consumer advocates had filed a
ballot proposal setting up a similar system. Again, following a court battle, a vol-
untary compromise system had been set up, though at the time of the California
campaign relatively few Ohio residents had been enrolled (California Healthcare
Foundation 2005). In this case, then, a direct democratic election campaign –
indeed the text of Proposition 79 itself – was shaped by the example of Maine’s
legislatively developed program.
These examples show what this paper theorizes. Citizens can learn from
neighbouring states1 about the effects of policy, and about the quality of their
politicians. In the jargon, political decisions have cross-border information exter-
nalities. Learning from your neighbours about policy is known in the literature
as “policy experimentation”, and “yardstick competition” is what results when
voters compare their representatives with those in neighbouring states. The rela-
tive importance of these two effects depends on a state’s political system – its
constitution in the broadest sense. If politicians are entrusted with discretion to
make policy, then voters will be concerned to judge their motivations and compe-
tence, and yardstick competition will predominate. Politicians themselves may
learn about policy from their neighbours, but if they have greater expertise in the
first place, this will be less important. In other states, where politicians are like
delegates, kept on a tight rein by institutions like the ballot initiative or simply by
a less trusting citizenry, policy will cleave closely to the voters’ opinions. As
voters have little rational incentive to delve into policy details, information from
neighbouring states will be more valuable, and policy experimentation will be the
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most important effect. At the extremes of this constitutional continuum lie the
ideal types of representative democracy, in which all policy-making power lies
with elected officials, and direct democracy, in which voters themselves always
decide. The flow of information across borders affects the tradeoffs between these
idealized institutions. This paper examines those effects. There are three main
results.
First, because different kinds of democracy produce and consume information
in different ways, they affect (and are affected by) their neighbours differently. In
particular, representative democracies may be more informative to their neigh-
bours than direct democracies, for the following reason. Policy experimentation
produces useful information for all states, but it is in citizens’ interests to let
other states bear the cost of the experiment, which can go wrong. Thus, direct
democracies experiment too little: even when voters can compare many direct
democracies, the best policy may not become known. By contrast, when elected
representatives have the knowledge to implement a good policy, but may not
want to, neighbouring representative democracies may discipline them via the
mechanism of yardstick competition. Here there is no need to experiment: politi-
cians know that bad policy choices will be punished by the voters, so always
choose good ones. So yardstick competition always works to reveal the best
policy, which other states can then copy. Thus, in this paper, more information
flows from representative democracies than from direct democracies; existing liter-
ature, discussed below, focuses mainly on information coming from direct democ-
racies.2 Now, because representative democracies provide more information, direct
democracies may outperform representative democracies, but only in the presence
of representative democratic neighbours. As a result, it may be best for voters to
have a mixture of direct and representative democratic systems. Much of the cur-
rent literature compares these two forms of democracy and tries to discover, free
of context, which one is better for voters. According to this paper, the answer
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could well be “it depends”. One form of democracy may currently be better for
voters, but the outcome if more states adopted this form could still be worse for
everybody.
The second result follows from the first. Because the benefits of direct democ-
racy decrease as the number of direct democracies increases, if states choose their
constitutions independently of one another, a mixture of constitutional forms can
be reached in equilibrium. This may help to explain why the ballot initiative
institution spread across the US, but stopped almost completely after being
adopted in 24 states.
Finally, the mix of constitutions that gets chosen in equilibrium is not always
welfare-maximizing. The reason is that constitutional choice, just like policy
choice, has externalities across states. An optimal outcome can then only be
achieved if states cooperate in choosing their constitutions, which is unlikely
unless there is a central governing body.
In the next section, I discuss this paper’s contribution to the existing litera-
ture. Section 7 sets out the model. Section 7 shows equilibrium policy choices
when there are one or more direct democracies, one or more representative
democracies, or a mixture of both kinds, and shows how information spillovers
affects the trade-off between the constitutions. Section 7 examines constitutional
choice when each state takes its neighbours’ constitutions as given, and explores
the optimal mix of constitutions for voter welfare. This contains the main results.
Section 7 considers relaxing some of the model’s assumptions. The conclusion
sums up and suggests directions for further research.
2 Existing literature
The political science literature on direct democratic institutions is organized
around the comparison with traditional representative democracy. This compar-
ison can be undertaken from many points of view. Here I focus on voter welfare.
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Theoretically, Gerber (1996) shows that in a complete information setting, poli-
cies are closer to the median voter when representatives face the threat of a pop-
ular initiative. To analyse the potential benefits of representation, incomplete
information is needed: in general, representatives should know something voters
don’t. Maskin and Tirole (2004) use a principal-agent model in the tradition of
Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) to analyse the trade-offs between different
forms of democracy given different parameters. I use a very similar framework to
show how those tradeoffs shift when policy outcomes can be observed in neigh-
bouring states.
The empirical literature on direct democracy has developed alongside and in
response to the theory. The standard format is a comparison of different political
units within federations, either in the US or Switzerland. Most of these studies
provide evidence that US states with the ballot initiative have policies closer to
the will of the majority (Gerber 1996, 1999; Arceneaux 2002, Bowler and
Donovan 2004, Matsusaka 2004, Burden 2005), although the finding is not uni-
versal (Lascher et al. 1996, Camobreco 1998; but see Matsusaka 2001). A related
question is whether policy in these states is better in some objectively measurable
sense. Again, the answer is positive (Feld and Savioz 1997, Feld and Kirchgässner
2000; Frey and Stutzer 2000 find that citizens are happier in Swiss cantons with
the citizen’s initiative).
To sum up, political science theory and empirical work mainly support the
view that direct democratic institutions improve voter welfare. But this gives rise
to an important positive question. As Matsusaka (1999 p. 133) points out: “the
models imply that voters are always better off... having the initiative process
available. If so, then why do only half of the states and cities in the country have
it?” [Italics in original.] This paper offers an answer: the existing mix of constitu-
tions affects the comparison. Even if voters are better off in initiative states, an
increase in the number of those states might make all voters worse off; in fact,
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there may be too many initiative states in equilibrium. If so, the empirical work
done so far, though interesting and important, does not allow us to draw policy
conclusions about whether direct democracy should be extended.
The key processes modelled by this paper are policy experimentation and
yardstick competition. There is a literature on each. Theoretically, policy experi-
mentation does not require decentralized policy choice: a social planner could
choose different policies for different states. Indeed, Rose-Ackerman (1980) and
Strumpf (2002) investigate the incentives for regions to experiment in a decentral-
ized system, and show that there is too little experimentation. In Strumpf the
cause is an information externality. That result reoccurs here in a different frame-
work (Section 4.3). The idea of yardstick competition was introduced into polit-
ical economy by Salmon (1987). Some recent papers have compared its workings
under different constitutional forms. Wrede (2001) examines different party sys-
tems. Schaltegger and Küttel (2002) argue informally that within a representative
framework, direct democratic institutions will reduce yardstick competition by
mitigating representative democracy’s incentive problems. This paper brings
together yardstick competition and policy experimentation in a single framework,
and formally shows how they affect the tradeoffs involved in delegating power to
representatives.
An empirical research tradition within political science examines policy diffu-
sion between nations or federal political subunits (see e.g. Berry and Berry 1999).
Social learning is recognized as a key cause of policy diffusion, but normally in
this literature the learners are bureaucrats or politicians, not voters. The idea
that the electorate may learn from other states is present in an early paper
(Walker 1969), but until recently, the policy diffusion literature has ignored yard-
stick competition and focused more on policy experimentation as a theoretical
model. However, some recent papers mention yardstick competition (Bailey et al.
2004; Rincke 2007). In particular, the diffusion of morality policy is probably
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better explained by yardstick competition than by policy experimentation. For
example, Haider-Markel (2001) describes how in the 1990s, campaigning by con-
servative religious groups caused anti-gay-marriage legislation to spread extremely
fast through US states. I would argue that legislation spread quickly because,
once one state passed the law, legislators in other states feared being exposed
as “anti-family” by comparison if they did nothing. A formal model integrating
both policy learning and yardstick competition could provide a basis for empirical
work on this process.
Matsusaka (2004) discusses the possibility that well-intentioned representative
politicians learn about voter preferences from direct democratic institutions.
Boehmke (1999) models this process. Politicians learn from their neighbours
about voter support for a potential initiative in their own state: in an empirical
examination of casino gaming, he shows policy diffusion occurring only between
initiative states. In the present paper, there is policy diffusion from representative
to direct democracies; direct democracies also have the potential to discipline
their representative neighbours, as politicians fear being removed from office if
they do not copy popular policies.
Finally the paper adds to a growing theoretical literature that endogenizes the
process of constitutional choice: see for example Aghion et al. (2002), Barbera
and Jackson (2004). An innovation here is to focus on the international context of
constitutional choice. This seems likely to be an important determinant, espe-
cially in small and globalized countries.
3 The model
The model uses a simple principal-agent framework. Policy is a choice between
two distinct alternatives. Voters share common interests, but do not know which
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policy will best serve those interests. Politicians know the best policy for the
voters, but may themselves prefer the other policy. There are one or more states.
Voters observe policy choices, and their results, in other states as well as their
own, but the effects of policy are observed imperfectly: voters cannot entirely dis-
tinguish bad policy from bad luck. However, “luck” – a random shock to voter
welfare – is correlated perfectly between states, so that when states choose dif-
ferent policies, the difference in outcomes reveals the best policy. There are thus
two commonalities between states: the best policy and the shock. These strong
assumptions help to bring out the intuition of the model: Section 7 considers what
happens when they are relaxed.
Formally, states are numbered 1,  , n, with typical member j, and relevant
variables (u1, u2, d1, d2, r, δ) are indexed with superscripts, which are dropped
when the sense is clear. There are two periods. In each period t= 1, 2, a policy dt
j
is chosen from two possible options, a or b. One of these two policies is better
than the other: call the best policy x. x does not change between periods. With
probability γ > 1/2, x= a, otherwise x= b. A high value of γ represents an “easy”
policy decision in which common sense or well-known facts favour one policy over
the other. The electorate does not observe x.
After period 1 the electorate gets utility from the policy and from a random
shock: u1 = δ + ε, where δ = 1 if d1 = x, δ = 0 otherwise, and ε is a mean zero
random variable with cdf Φ( · ) and pdf ϕ( · ). We make some technical assump-
tions about the shock: ϕ is symmetric and differentiable, has full support on R,
and is single-peaked at 0, and the induced distribution of u1, with cdf Θ(u) =
Φ(u − δ) and pdf θ( · ), satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property with
respect to δ. These will all be satisfied if, for example, ε is normally distributed.
In period 2, the electorate receives utility u2 = 1 if d2 = x, u2 = 0 otherwise: we
ignore any period 2 shock to utility. The assumption of common interests can be
interpreted as follows: a majority of voters prefer x, and δ represents the differ-
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ence in total utility between serving the majority and serving the minority.
The electorate in each state observes period 1 policy decisions, and the
resulting voter utility levels, in all states. This learning process need not demand
unrealistic levels of citizen political engagement; instead, it can be thought of as a
reflection of a well-functioning democratic system, in which relevant information
is publicized by interest groups, political parties, the media, and so on. The
number of states n is a simple way to represent the effect of having more states to
compare outcomes over: more complex structures would be possible, for example
with states only learning from geographic neighbours. The utility shock ε and the
best policy x are common between states. Therefore, when policies differ, all elec-
torates will learn which is the better policy by observing higher utility in some
states. If policies are the same, on the other hand, no extra information is
learned. Having x common between states is one end of a possible continuum of
assumptions: at the other end, the best policy could be completely independent
between states, in which case choices in neighbouring states would bear no lessons
for voters (though they might be able to infer the value of the shock ε from
observing utility). The assumption of a common shock ε can be thought of as
reflecting the benefits from having “variation in the independent variable”, when
potential policy utility is in fact unknown. That is, citizens possess some informa-
tion about the utility of the status quo, simply because they experience it in their
daily lives. But they lack the opportunity or motivation to learn what their utility
would counterfactually be under the alternative policy. If the alternative is tried
elsewhere, this information becomes freely available, and can be reported via the
media, for example. To be clear, I am not assuming that all citizens pay careful
attention to the policies and experience of different states. The Condorcet Jury
Theorem shows that even low levels of individual citizen information can result in
almost certainly correct decisions after aggregation by a democratic vote.
Rational ignorance is therefore a problem of information production, not of infor-
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mation aggregation. If the experience of neighbouring states provides costless
information about a policy, this can alter the voting outcome even if only a few
voters are aware of that information. Nevertheless, having a common shock and
common best policy are strong assumptions, and I discuss the effect of loosening
them in Section 7.
I examine two kinds of constitution. In a direct democracy (DD), the elec-
torate chooses d1 and d2 for itself. In a representative democracy (RD), a repre-
sentative decides policy. The representative knows the correct policy x with cer-
tainty. This greater knowledge reflects the fact that representatives have access to
a bureaucratic staff, and choose policy unilaterally, whereas individual voters are
rationally ignorant because gathering information is costly and individual votes
are unlikely to affect the outcome. The representative has the same preferences as
the electorate over policy , i.e. prefers dt= x, with probability pi. Such a represen-
tative is called “congruent” or simply “good”. Otherwise the representative prefers
dt  x and is “non-congruent” or “bad”. Write r
j ∈ {a, b} for the jth representa-
tive’s preferred alternative. If rj= x= k ∈ {a, b}, we describe the representative as
a congruent k-type; if rj  x= k ∈{a, b}, we call her a non-congruent k-type.
At the broadest level, the possibility of non-congruent politicians is meant to
reflect the idea that elected officials do not always represent their citizens’ inter-
ests perfectly. A more specific interpretation, for pi> 1/2, would be that a propor-
tion pi of citizens prefers option x, while the minority prefers the other option: the
utility difference from choosing the majority-preferred option is normalized to 1,
and the politician is drawn at random from the citizens. In this model the proba-
bility of a politician being congruent is exogenous. It would be more realistic (but
also more complex) to assume that politicians only run for office if this offers
higher expected utility than some alternative career. If so, when voters were
better able to distinguish good from bad politicians, better politicians would run
for office. This would add to the positive effect of yardstick competition, by
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selecting bad politicians out before the political process started.
At the end of period 1 the electorate chooses either to eject the incumbent
representative and choose a new one, who will again be congruent with proba-
bility pi, or to keep the incumbent. Representatives get utility from staying in
office, and utility from implementing their preferred policy – but only if they
themselves implement it while in office. This could reflect either the motivation to
leave a political “legacy”, or policies that benefit the current office holder only,
such as an increase in the representative’s salary. (A more standard “policy moti-
vation” assumption, by which representatives care about policy outcomes whoever
implemented them, would not change the results.) Let G be the representative’s
utility from choosing her preferred action, R be the perks of office and 0 < β < 1
her discount rate between periods. Write
κ=
G
β(R+G)
(1)
for the relative benefit of choosing one’s preferred policy in period 1 compared to
choosing one’s preferred policy, and getting the perks of office for one more
period, in period 2. Two common motivational assumptions can be accommo-
dated within this framework: if G = 0 so that representatives are purely office-
motivated, then κ=0; if R=0, representatives care only about their “legacy” and
κ = 1/β > 1. If κ > 1, I say that the representative is impatient , because she is
more concerned about the immediate benefit of her preferred policy than about
the delayed benefits from office in period 2. In order to restrict off-equilibrium
beliefs and reduce the number of equilibria, I sometimes assume that a small pro-
portion of representatives is impatient, whatever the value of κ in general.
If a representative chooses d1  x, I say that the representative shirks, and if a
non-congruent representative chooses d1 = x  r, I say that the representative is
disciplined . Only non-congruent representatives shirk, but the converse is not
true.
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In this finitely repeated framework, representatives always choose their own
preferred policy in period 2. This motivates voters’ desire to reelect only con-
gruent representatives, whatever the equilibrium. Substantive results would be
similar in a repeated game where representatives always faced a further election:
under realistic assumptions, there are still going to be occasions (e.g. close to
retirement) when representatives will follow their own preferences rather than
those of the voters, and if so then congruent representatives will always be prefer-
able.
Some general remarks will help explain the model. The first-best outcome is
clearly for x to be chosen in both periods, giving utility of 2 if we assume no dis-
counting between periods, which is a reasonable approach for normative analysis
in this case.3
In a direct democracy, the electorate’s best period 1 choice is to follow its
prior and choose d1= a, giving period 1 utility of γ. After period 1, some informa-
tion is learned. At worst, if no learning takes place, the electorate can choose d2=
a and achieve expected utility of 2γ. At best, we could hope for the right policy x
to be discovered with certainty. Without discounting between periods, expected
utility would then be
γ+1. (2)
This provides an upper bound on performance from a direct democracy.
In a representative democracy, representatives always follow their preference
in period 2, d2= r, as they face no further elections. One possible outcome is that
in period 1, representatives always choose d1= x, perhaps because of the threat of
losing the election if they do not do so. Voter welfare is then
1+ pi ; (3)
as all representatives behave equally well in period 1, there is no way for voters to
distinguish them and eject non-congruent representatives. On the other hand,
maybe all representatives choose d1= r. In particular if κ > 1 then representatives
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will certainly choose d1 = r, as κ > 1⇔ G > β(R + G) means that the immediate
benefit of following one’s preference outweighs even the certainty of electoral
defeat. Then the electorate faces a problem of detecting and ejecting non-con-
gruent representatives, and retaining congruent ones. Say that a non-congruent
representative is detected and ejected with probability X. It may also be that a
congruent representative is falsely thought to be non-congruent and ejected. Let
Y be the probability of this kind of “false positive”. Voter utility will then be
pi[1+ (1−Y )+Ypi]
+ (1− pi)[0+Xpi]
= 2pi+pi(1− pi)(X −Y ), (4)
recalling that a new representative has probability pi of being congruent.
Expressions (3) and (4) reveal a tradeoff between moral hazard and adverse
selection. When representatives are undisciplined in period 1, the voters suffer
from moral hazard: their agent, the representative, may take the worse action for
them. However, the difference between good and bad representatives’ actions
allows them to detect at least some bad representatives. On the other hand, if
representatives are disciplined in period 1, voters suffer from adverse selection:
they cannot weed out bad representatives who are then free to follow their prefer-
ences in period 2. Because replacement representatives are themselves not always
congruent, the gain from detecting bad representatives who shirk is never enough
to compensate for the period 1 loss. Even in the best possible case, X −Y =1, (4)
evaluates to 2pi + pi(1− pi) < 2pi + (1− pi) = 1 + pi. So, in general, (3) provides an
upper bound on the performance of representative democracy, and (4) provides an
upper bound on RDs when representatives shirk.
The analysis focuses on the best available equilibrium for the voters, in order
to examine the different institutions at their peak performance. Representatives
in different states could coordinate on an equilibrium that is best for them not the
voters, but a full exploration of this requires a paper in its own right and is left
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for future work (see the conclusion). There is one exception to this rule: when
there are many direct democracies (Section 4.3), I examine a mixed equilibrium
rather than a more efficient, but implausible, asymmetric pure strategy equilib-
rium.
4 Policy choice
I first analyse equilibrium when n = 1, as a benchmark, then look in turn at the
cases of more than one direct democracy, more than one representative democ-
racy, and a mixture of systems.
4.1 A single direct democracy
Our first proposition describes the unique equilibrium under direct democracy
when there is only one state. In this setting, the electorate chooses d1 = a, in
accordance with its prior belief, and then stays with option a unless its period 1
utility is below a particular cutpoint u¯ . So with only one state, direct democracy
is inefficient because the electorate receives only a noisy signal from choosing
policy.
Proposition 1. When there is a single direct democracy, d1 = a and d2 = a if
u1 > u¯, d2 = b otherwise, where u¯ uniquely solves ϕ(u¯ )/ϕ(u¯ − 1) = γ/(1 − γ).
Expected voter utility is γ+ γ(1−Φ(u¯ − 1))+ (1− γ)Φ(u¯ ).
Proof. See the appendix. 
4.2 A single representative democracy
The fundamental issue in representative democracy is whether non-congruent rep-
resentatives are disciplined by the threat of losing an election, or shirk because
they are impatient or because the electorate cannot distinguish congruent from
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non-congruent representatives accurately enough. In a single state, there is also a
third case involving only partial discipline.
Definition. A disciplined equilibrium is one in which all types of representative
play d1= x and d2= r. In a moral hazard equilibrium, all types of representatives
choose their own preferred action at all times: d1= d2= r.
Proposition 2. When there is a single representative democracy:
1. There is a disciplined equilibrium if and only if κ6 Φ(u¯ )− Φ(− u¯ ). Voter
utility in this equilibrium is 1+ pi.
2. There is a moral hazard equilibrium if and only if κ>Φ(1− u¯ )−Φ(u¯ − 1).
Voter utility is 2pi+pi(1−pi){Φ(u¯ )−Φ(u¯ − 1)}.
3. If and only if Φ(u¯ )−Φ(− u¯ )<κ<Φ(1− u¯ )−Φ(u¯ − 1), there is an equi-
librium in mixed strategies: congruent types play d1 = x, while non-con-
gruent types play d1 = a (shirk) when x = b and mix between a and b when
x= a.
Proof. See the appendix. 
The condition for a disciplined equilibrium depends on three factors: the level
of representatives’ impatience κ, the form of the utility shock distribution Φ, and
the ease of the issue γ (which determines u¯ given ϕ). Clearly a higher level of
impatience makes a disciplined equilibrium harder to achieve. As γ→ 1, u¯ →−∞
and again it becomes harder to achieve a disciplined equilibrium. In particular, if
u¯ < 0 it will be impossible to fulfil condition 1. The intuition here is that when γ
is high, it will take a very low utility level to persuade voters that the best policy
is b. So a non-congruent b-type will face a big temptation to defect. Finally, when
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the variance of the utility shock is high, discipline will be harder to achieve as it is
harder for voters to know when they are being cheated.
4.3 Many direct democracies
Suppose now that there are n > 1 states, all direct democracies. If at least one
state chooses each policy, all electorates can learn the best policy with certainty
after the first period. But an electorate that chooses the less likely policy b is
going against its prior. If a is very likely to be the best policy, the electorate will
prefer to choose d1 = a and bear the resulting loss of information. This informa-
tion is also lost to all other states, and as a result the equilibrium is inefficient.
Even if the prior γ is low enough that a single electorate in state j, faced with all
other states choosing a, would prefer to choose d1
j = b, one would not necessarily
expect this to happen, because all electorates will prefer that some other state
pay the cost of choosing b. In fact, there is a mixed equilibrium in which all states
randomize between policies. As a result, sometimes all states choose the same
policy, normally a, and are unable to learn the best policy with certainty. Thus,
direct democracies are unable to fully exploit the advantages of cross-border infor-
mation for policy experimentation, because no single electorate wants to experi-
ment on behalf of all the others.
Proposition 3. When there are n> 1 direct democratic states,
1. if and only if γ < γ¯ where γ¯ uniquely solves γ¯ =
1+Φ(− u¯)
2−Φ(u¯− 1)+Φ(− u¯)
there is a
symmetric mixed equilibrium in which all electorates choose d1 = a with
probability α ∈ [1/2, 1); for any fixed γ < γ¯, α increases towards 1 as n→
∞, and αn→
2γ − 1
γΦ(u¯− 1)+ (1− γ)Φ(− u¯)
> 0 as n→∞.
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2. otherwise, all states play d1 = a with certainty, giving expected voter utility
of γ+ γ(1−Φ(u¯ − 1))+ (1− γ)Φ(u¯ )< γ+1.
Proof. See the appendix.4 
Here αn gives the probability that all electorates choose a in the first period.
When this happens, learning is not complete and the wrong policy may be chosen
in the second period. As αn is positive, no matter how many states there are,
there is always a positive probability of this miscoordination, so that direct
democracies on their own never achieve the best possible voter utility of γ+1.
This inefficiency naturally brings up the question of side-payments. If there
were a mechanism which let some states pay others for making a risky policy
experiment, then the electorates could agree a suitable payment and ensure that
some state chose b in period 1. Doing this directly via agreements among elec-
torates – perhaps a series of popular votes mandating a payment of X if all other
states offer the same – seems unrealistic given the transaction costs involved. A
benevolent central government could coordinate payments via taxes, but there
may not be a central government for the group of states concerned. Also, the
model assumes that politicians are self-interested. Extending this assumption to
central government, centralization may be more about allowing collusion between
politicians than about solving voters’ coordination problems.
4.4 Many representative democracies
Representatives are still congruent with probability pi, and we assume that con-
gruence is independent between states.5 If all states use representative democracy,
then as before there are equilibria in which representatives are disciplined to
choose d1
j = x, and moral hazard equilibria in which they follow their preferences.
However, the condition for discipline is weaker, because if the representative in
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any other state is disciplined and choosing d1 = x, then a choice of d1  x will be
revealed with certainty by the utility difference. So a non-congruent representa-
tive stands no chance of reelection if she chooses to follow her own preference.
Also, even if representatives are impatient enough for a moral hazard equilibrium,
the possibility of different representatives choosing differently approaches 1 as n
gets large. Again, this difference between states will reveal x, so that non-con-
gruent representatives can be detected and weeded out.
Proposition 4. When there are n > 1 representative democracies, iff κ6 1, there
is a disciplined equilibrium in which voter welfare is 1 + pi. If κ > K(n), where
K(n) < 1 and K(n)→ 1 as n→∞, then there is a moral hazard equilibrium and
voter welfare approaches 2pi+pi(1−pi) as n→∞.
Proof. If representatives in all states j choose d1
j = x, a non-congruent represen-
tative who unilaterally deviates is certainly detected because the electorate
observes the difference in utility levels between the states. Specifically, if there is
a small proportion of impatient representatives who always follow their own pref-
erences and choose d1
j= r, then given equilibrium strategies, the electorate in state
j will conclude, on observing d1
j
 d1
k and u1
j < u1
k for some state k, that their rep-
resentative is impatient and non-congruent, and eject her. Thus, the condition for
this equilibrium is simply G 6 β(R + G) ⇔ κ 6 1. As representatives are disci-
plined, voter welfare is 1+pi as in (3).
Suppose that all representatives choose d1
j = rj where rj is the state j repre-
sentative’s own preference. Then, if d1
j
 d1
k for some j , k ∈ {1, n}, non-con-
gruent representatives will be revealed by the utility difference, and they will be
ejected with certainty (and congruent representatives will be certainly reelected).
The probability of this event is
1−pin− (1−pi)n→ 1 as n→∞. (5)
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Thus as n grows large the probability of survival in office for a non-congruent rep-
resentative choosing d1
j = rj approaches 0 and the condition to choose d1
j = rj
becomes G > β(R + G) ⇔ κ > 1. As congruence and non-congruence are almost
always detected, voter welfare approaches the best possible for a moral hazard
equilibrium: 2pi+ pi(1−pi), as in (4). 
Cross-border learning helps representative democracy just as it does direct
democracy: voters can observe and make inferences from the difference in out-
comes between states. But in a RD the inefficiency of experimentation can be
avoided, because the threat alone of discovery motivates representatives to choose
the best outcome. In technical terms, the worse policy is chosen only “off the equi-
librium path”.
Note that while the disciplined equilibrium does not require a large number of
states – the conditions will suffice even when there are just 2 – the moral hazard
equilibrium approaches maximum welfare only when there are many states. In a
system with just a few states, shirking will sometimes go undetected because all
representatives chose the same policy, and so a moral hazard equilibrium will
exist for values of κ less than one.6 Thus there are multiple possible equilibria. I
assume that when κ6 1 the disciplined equilibrium, which gives the highest voter
welfare, is selected.
4.5 A mixed system
Finally, I examine the case where states 1,  , m use representative democracy,
while the remaining n − m states use direct democracy. I assume that there are
least two representative democracies. As before, if κ 6 1, there is a disciplined
equilibrium in which all representatives choose d1
j = x for j ∈ {1,  , m}. The con-
dition for this is simply that m > 1; as shirking is always detected anyway, the
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presence of DD states makes detection no easier. But the RD states do help
voters in the DDs, who can infer x with certainty from representatives’ period 1
choices and equilibrium strategies, and can therefore follow their prior and choose
d1= a, achieving their best possible utility of γ+1.
This point is key. Section 4.3 showed that, in the presence of other direct
democracies, a direct democracy will not achieve its maximum voter utility,
because of the costs of experimentation. But if there are representative democra-
cies, and their representatives are disciplined to choose the right policy, then the
direct democracy can copy from them and achieve maximum voter utility. In
other words, direct democracy is better for voters when there are representative
democracies to learn from, than when there are only other direct democracies.
In a moral hazard equilibrium when κ > 1, the presence of direct democratic
states again makes little difference to RDs as impatient representatives prefer the
benefits of shirking even if they are detected with certainty. If m is sufficiently
large, the direct democracies will again be able to infer the correct policy – this
time by observing the utility difference between representative states, some of
whose representatives will almost certainly choose either policy option. Thus
again they can follow their prior in period 1 and achieve expected welfare of γ +
1. So, the presence of representative democracies allows direct democracies to
avoid the inefficiency loss from not experimenting. The following proposition sums
up our discussion.
Proposition 5. In a mixed system with m > 1 representative democratic states,
there is an equilibrium iff κ6 1 in which all representatives are disciplined, d1
j = x
for j ∈ {1, , m} and direct democratic states choose d1
j = a for j ∈ {m+ 1, , n}.
There is an equilibrium in which non-congruent representatives shirk, d1
j = rj for
j ∈ {1,  , m}, if κ > 1; in this equilibrium, for large enough n −m, again d1
j = a
for j ∈{m+1, , n}.
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Average voter utility in a mixed system equals
(1+ pi)
m
n
+(1+ γ)
n−m
n
(6)
when n−m> 1 and κ6 1, and approaches
(2pi+ pi(1−pi))
m
n
+(1+ γ)
n−m
n
(7)
when κ > 1 and m grows large. In these cases, direct and representative democra-
cies are performing at or near their best, giving the highest possible utility levels.
Because there are many of both kinds of democratic institution, every state bene-
fits as much as possible by learning from both kinds.
5 Constitutional choice and voter welfare
Constitutions are not fixed. Ideally, a state’s constitution is chosen by its citizens.
But they make this choice in a context partly determined by other states’ actions.
Democratization proceeds in waves, partly because the democratic forces in any
country are likely to be encouraged by the success of nearby revolutions (Hunt-
ington 1991; Boix 2003). Similarly, the populist and progressive movements intro-
duced the initiative in 19 US states during the first quarter of the 20th century
(Cronin 1989). Here, I make the very simple assumption that voters are able to
choose the constitution they prefer. The context I focus on is provided by the
information available from other states during the normal policy-making process.
States with different democratic institutions learn differently from their neigh-
bours, and the learning process also depends on their neighbours’ constitutions.
In particular, as the last section showed, a direct democracy gains from having
many representative democratic neighbours. So, when all other states are RDs,
direct democracy may be preferable to representative democracy, but when all
other states are DDs, the reverse may be true. If so, there will be an equilibrium
involving a mixture of costitutions.
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To clarify this formally, I define a simple notion of stability for a given set of
constitutions.
Definition. A system of direct and/or representative democracies is stable if
each state’s electorate prefers the state to keep its current constitution, given that
all other states do the same. Preference is defined in terms of expected utility from
the best possible equilibrium in the policy choice game.
We can interpret this idea of stability in two ways. One interpretation would
be that all voters simultaneously choose their states’ constitutions. Stability then
just means that there is a Nash equilibrium in their choices of constitution.
Another interpretation is closer to historical reality. Suppose that, at some time,
voters in a single state choose which form of democracy to use, perhaps by
holding a relatively rare constitutional convention, and that they ignore any
future changes in other states’ constitutions, perhaps because voters have rela-
tively short time horizons. For example, this corresponds roughly to how US
states have revised their constitutions over time. In this case, a stable system is
one in which no state will change its constitution on its own.
The next Proposition shows that for certain parameter values, only a mixed
system can be stable. For simplicity’s sake I focus on the case when γ is large
enough that all direct democracies choose policy a in period 1, and on extreme
values of κ, although the logic would continue to hold for lower values of γ and
intermediate values of κ.
Proposition 6. 1. For κ < Φ(u¯ ) and any γ > γ¯, there is some pi such that nei-
ther a system of representative democracies nor a system of direct democracies is
stable.
2. For κ > 1 and any γ > γ¯, there is some pi such that when n is large enough,
neither a system of n representative democracies nor a system of n direct democ-
racies is stable.
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Proof. See the appendix. 
I next analyse voter welfare. The intuition is as follows. If representative
democracy when politicians are disciplined outperforms direct democracy at its
best, then to maximize voter welfare we ought to have all representative democra-
cies, for then politicians will be disciplined very easily by their neighbours, and
this will be better in every state than having even the best direct democracy. On
the other hand, if direct democracy at its best outperforms representative democ-
racy, then we may still want to have a few representative democracies around for
the direct democracies to learn from. Otherwise, the direct democracies may not
achieve their best, because they are unable to solve the collective action problem
of policy experimentation. In general, the positive externality from RDs should
decrease with the number of RDs: as correct policy becomes clearer, it is less nec-
essary to have an extra RD to ensure it.
Proposition 7. When κ6 1, and n is high enough, the welfare-maximizing set of
constitutions always includes at least one representative democracy, and is com-
posed only of representative democracies if pi > γ.
Proof. Suppose that κ 6 1. From (6), clearly if pi > γ it maximizes voter welfare
to have all RDs, as these will be disciplined and achieve welfare of 1 + pi which is
greater than the highest possible welfare in a direct democracy.
If pi < γ, and n is large, then when there are two RDs from (6) average welfare
is
2
n
(1 + pi) +
n− 2
n
(1 + γ) which approaches 1 + γ as n grows large. (If κ is low
enough that a single RD would be disciplined, slightly higher welfare can be
achieved by having only one RD). On the other hand, a constitution of only DDs
will not achieve their maximum welfare of 1 + γ, as they will not learn the right
policy with certainty in period 2 (see Proposition 3). Thus for n large enough, it
will be better to have at least one representative democracy. 
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We might also ask whether the optimal profile of constitutions will be reached
in equilibrium. When the optimal profile is a mixture of DDs and RDs, this does
not always happen. The reason is analogous to the case of policy experimentation
with many direct democracies: no individual state wants to bear the loss of being
a RD and providing information to its neighbours.
Proposition 8. When κ6 1, n> 3 and pi > γ then the welfare-maximizing set of
constitutions is stable. When κ 6 1, pi < γ and n is large, the welfare-maximizing
set of constitutions may not be stable.
Proof. If pi > γ and n > 3 then trivially no RD electorate would wish to become
a DD and gain utility of 1+ γ rather than 1+ pi, so a set of all RDs is stable.
If pi < γ and n is high enough, then the welfare-maximizing set of constitutions
contains either two or one representative democracies, with welfare of 1 + γ for
DDs and 1 + pi for RDs. Clearly no DD will switch. An example shows that in
some, but not all cases an RD will switch. Suppose that κ = 0 so that the repre-
sentatives in a single RD are disciplined: thus there is just one RD in the optimal
system, by the previous Proposition. Let γ > γ¯ so that every state will choose
d1 = a in an an all-DD system. Switching to direct democracy will then give our
RD utility of γ + γ(1 − Φ(u¯ − 1)) + (1 − γ)Φ(u¯ ) < 1 + γ (Proposition 3). Thus,
there are two cases: if
1+ pi < γ+ γ(1−Φ(u¯ − 1))+ (1− γ)Φ(u¯ )
then the RD will switch to DD; if
γ+ γ(1−Φ(u¯ − 1))+ (1− γ)Φ(u¯ )< 1+pi < 1+ γ
it will not.7 
What if representatives are not disciplined? As before, there are two possibili-
ties. First, even undisciplined representatives may outperform direct democracy
at its best, and if so it will be best to have only RDs. But if direct democracy can
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outperform undisciplined representatives, it may still be useful to have some RDs
because of the chance that they will implement different preferred policies and
thus, in effect, do the policy experimentation for the DDs. (This argument
depends crucially on representatives’ policy choices being varied. If undisciplined
representatives all chose the same policy option – perhaps a lazy default – then
there would be no gains from experimentation.) However, this means that there is
a positive externality from having RDs and in equilibrium there are then normally
too few RDs.
Proposition 9. If κ > 1 and n is large, and γ > γ¯ as defined in Proposition 3;
then
1. when 2pi + pi(1− pi)> 1 + γ then a system of all representative democracies
is stable and maximizes voter welfare;
2. when 2pi + pi(1− pi) < 1 + γ then in general the equilibrium number of rep-
resentative democracies is smaller than the welfare-maximizing number of
representative democracies.
Proof. See the appendix. 
A typical illustration is given in Figure 1. Here the x axis represents the
number of representative democracies, and the y axis gives utility. (Parameters
were set to pi= 0.63, γ = 0.5, n= 10 and Φ normally distributed with σ2= 1.) The
solid and dashed lines give voter utility in RDs and DDs respectively. The equi-
librium outcome will be close to where these lines cross: otherwise voters in one
kind of state could gain by switching to the other. In this case there are 4 repre-
sentative democracies in equilibrium, as when there are 3 RDs a DD can gain by
changing to an RD. Average voter utility is shown by the dotted line and is maxi-
mized with 6 representative democracies.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
Figure 1. Optimum and equilibrium number of representative democracies
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Figure 1 illustrates a point mentioned earlier. In equilibrium, with 4 RDs,
voter welfare is higher in the DDs than in RDs. Empirical work in this situation
would “demonstrate” the superiority of direct democracy. But voter welfare in all
states would decrease if there were more direct democracies, and average voter
welfare would increase if there were more RDs!
6 Loosening the assumptions
I now consider loosening some of the model’s simple assumptions.
Perfect observability of neighbouring states, and the common utility shock,
could be weakened to imperfect observability or imperfectly correlated shocks in
states. In either case, when policy varied between states, citizens would only gain
probabilistic knowledge of x. Perfect discipline would thus no longer require only
two states and κ6 1; instead, discipline would be easier to achieve (i.e. be in equi-
librium for higher values of κ) as the number of representative democracies
increased, as each extra RD would make knowledge of x, and thus of representa-
tives’ congruence, more accurate. If discipline were achieved, direct democracies
would still be able to freeride off their neighbours by observing their policy
choices. So our fundamental result of the externality between types of constitu-
tions would remain.
What if the best policy varies between states? After all, without this possi-
bility, decentralized policy-making loses one of its basic justifications (Oates 1999;
but for a different line of reasoning, see Besley and Coate 2003). If the best policy
were completely independent between states, then observation of neighbours
would only give more information about the value of the shock: with a common
shock, this might still tell citizens whether the best policy had been chosen, but
having policy variation would no longer be necessary or sufficient for this. Disci-
plined equilibria would still exist, as a deviator would still be revealed by the
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utility difference between states; direct democracies would thus still benefit from
RD neighbours, but a system of DDs would approach maximum utility of γ+1 as
n grew large, because even if all states choose a, there are likely to be utility dif-
ferences between states which reveal whether each has chosen its preferred option.
Thus, for all-DD systems to be suboptimal, there must be at least some correla-
tion between the best policy in each state; the higher this correlation, the more
slowly maximum utility is approached as n increases, because learning from utility
differences is less likely when all states choose a. Finally, if both x and ε are inde-
pendent between states, then of course citizens simply learn nothing from their
neighbours.
A key assumption when representatives are undisciplined is that they may
shirk to either option. An alternative approach would be to assume that shirkers
always choose one option, say a. For example, arguably it is always easier for rep-
resentatives to increase borrowing rather than taxation, as borrowing affects
future citizens. Under this approach, shirkers will not be detected when the best
option is indeed a, no matter how many states there are. So the minimum κ to
allow a moral hazard equilibrium will not increase towards 1 as n grows large.
Nevertheless, the presence of RDs continues to benefit DDs when n is large: DDs
will either observe all representatives choosing a, and conclude that almost cer-
tainly x = a, or will observe variation with congruent representatives choosing b,
and learn that x = b. Exploring this option leads naturally to the possibility of
representatives colluding, perhaps via side payments, to enforce a uniform policy.
This is discussed further below.
In general, then, the externalities between states are quite robust to loosening
the model’s stylized assumptions. A more fundamental change would be to have
conflict of interest between citizens. If the policy choice remains binary, then so
long as the majority-preferred policy also maximizes social welfare, conflict can be
accommodated within the model by assuming that 1 represents the utility differ-
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ence between satisfying the majority and the minority. But it would also be
useful to model a richer set of policy alternatives, with a continuous policy space,
and a common shock to the median voter’s optimal policy, observed only by
politicians. Intuitively, yardstick competition would still discipline representatives
towards the median voter, while direct democracies would face the same externali-
ties as before in experimenting with different positions.
7 Conclusion
All states must choose what level of control to exert over elected representatives –
to subject them tightly to the popular will, and risk losing their expertise, or to
give them free rein and risk the effects of their self-interest. This choice is made
partly at the constitutional level, and the best choice may depend on the level of
information provided by the environment, in particular by other states’ choice of
policies. Learning from other states creates two benefits. First, citizens them-
selves can observe the effects of policy and may be in a better position to make
decisions themselves: this is the benefit of policy experimentation. Second, citi-
zens can judge their elected officials against those in neighbouring states. This is
the benefit of yardstick competition. But there is an asymmetry between these
benefits. Citizens’ rational ignorance of the best policy can only be removed by
actual experimentation. And because one state must bear the risk of an untried
policy, there may be a collective action problem which leaves the gains from
experimentation unrealised. On the other hand, self-interested representatives
may be deterred from bad choices by the threat of being caught out, so that the
gains from avoiding moral hazard can be had without any state losing out. This is
particularly likely if there are many representatives, all of whom discipline each
other and prevent any of their number from stepping out of line. When this hap-
pens, voters themselves will be able to trust the policies chosen by representatives
in neighbouring states, and may wish to implement them themselves if their rep-
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resentatives are not willing, as when California’s Proposition 79 was based on the
plan of the Maine legislature. Direct democracy may then outperform representa-
tive democracy only if there are enough representative democratic neighbours.
In this context it is suggestive to consider the history of the ballot initiative in
the US. The initiative was introduced at a time of deep dissatisfaction with
elected representatives, who were seen as corrupt representatives of party politics
(Cronin 1989) and who were out of touch with the concerns of voters in the new
cities of the mid-West (Matsusaka 2004). 19 states introduced the initiative in the
first quarter of the 20th century. But the rush to direct democracy ended as
swiftly as it started, and since 1920 only four new states have introduced the
ballot initiative. Cronin claims (p. 59) that “even though its most fervent cham-
pions often intended less to strengthen representative democracy than to bypass
or punish it, it simultaneously helped remedy the defects of representative polit-
ical institutions.” Undoubtedly the major effect the initiative had was on represen-
tatives in states which adopted the institution. But if other states were unaf-
fected, it is hard to see why their legislatures were not also forced to accept the
initiative. One possible answer is that competition from initiative states – and
perhaps the threat of an active and successful direct democracy movement – drove
up legislative standards and reduced the pressure for change.
My final result is that because representatives help to discipline each other,
there is an externality between states choosing how much power to delegate to
them. It may be that electorates in individual states prefer to retain more power
than is ideal for them collectively. All states would then benefit from a collective
agreement to move towards representative democracy.
The model here probably underestimates the benefit representative democra-
cies receive from yardstick competition, in two senses. First, by providing more
information for citizens, neighbouring states make life easier for “good” politicians
and harder for “bad” ones. This will affect the incentives to run for office and
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change the mix of politicians who do so. In the current model the mix of good
and bad types is fixed.
Second, if their time horizons are long enough, representatives have opportuni-
ties and incentives to collude in order to prevent yardstick competition, just as
other oligopolists do. For example, representatives might be able to coordinate on
choosing their own preferred policies, rather than those desired by the electorate.
In the context of long-term political relationships or institutions like political par-
ties, they may even be able to constrain each other to choose a uniform policy so
that no individual politician stands out as especially good or bad. As the story of
California’s Proposition 13 suggests, direct democracy can break this collusion by
demonstrating that certain policy alternatives are workable. This kind of benefit
can only be provided by direct democracy, and it might be observed even when
direct democracy is not in itself a very effective decision-making mechanism.
Direct democracy’s positive externalities in preventing collusive behaviour
between representatives offer a promising avenue for further research.
Appendix: proofs of propositions
Proposition 1. When there is a single direct democracy, d1 = a and d2 = a if
u1 > u¯, d2 = b otherwise, where u¯ uniquely solves ϕ(u¯ )/ϕ(u¯ − 1) = γ/(1 − γ).
Expected voter utility is γ+ γ(1−Φ(u¯ − 1))+ (1− γ)Φ(u¯ ).
Proof. The electorate chooses d1 = a, in accordance with its prior. The elec-
torate’s belief that x= a after receiving random utility of u1 is, by Bayes’ rule:
θ(u1|δ=1) γ
θ(u1|δ=1) γ+ θ(u1|δ=0) (1− γ)
=
ϕ(u1− 1) γ
ϕ(u1− 1) γ+ ϕ(u1) (1− γ)
= 1
/[
1+
ϕ(u1)(1− γ)
ϕ(u1− 1)γ
]
. (8)
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By the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) of θ, ϕ(u1)/ϕ(u1 − 1) is
decreasing in u1 and so the whole expression is increasing in u1. Let u¯ be the
utility level which solves (8) for 1/2: when u1 = u¯ , the electorate is indifferent
between a and b. For u1 > u¯ , the electorate strictly prefers a and for u1 < u¯ it
strictly prefers b. Algebra gives
ϕ(u¯ )/ϕ(u¯ − 1)= γ/(1− γ); (9)
this is at least 1, and as ϕ(1/2)/ϕ(− 1/2) = 1 by symmetry, this shows that u¯ 6
1/2. (9) has a unique solution as the left hand side is decreasing by the MLRP.
In other words, the prior biases the electorate in favour of a; if γ = 1/2 the elec-
torate is indifferent when u1 = 1/2, which is equally likely whether d1 is the right
policy or not.
Write U for total expected utility over both periods, without discounting.
Thus
U = γ+ γ Pr(d2= x|d1= x)+ (1− γ)Pr(d2= x|d1 x) (10)
where the first term is expected utility in period 1, and the next two terms are
expected utility in period 2 after respectively a correct and a wrong decision in
period 1. We rewrite this as
U = γ+ γ Pr(u1> u¯ |δ=1)+ (1− γ)Pr(u1< u¯ |δ=0)
= γ+ γ(1−Φ(u¯ − 1))+ (1− γ)Φ(u¯ ) (11)

Proposition 2. When there is a single representative democracy:
1. There is a disciplined equilibrium if and only if κ6 Φ(u¯ )− Φ(− u¯ ). Voter
utility in this equilibrium is 1+ pi.
2. There is a moral hazard equilibrium if and only if κ>Φ(1− u¯ )−Φ(u¯ − 1).
Voter utility is 2pi+pi(1−pi){Φ(u¯ )−Φ(u¯ − 1)}.
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3. If and only if Φ(u¯ )−Φ(− u¯ )<κ<Φ(1− u¯ )−Φ(u¯ − 1), there is an equi-
librium in mixed strategies: congruent types play d1 = x, while non-con-
gruent types play d1= a when x= b and mix between a and b when x= a.
Proof. In all equilibria, because representatives always follow their preferences in
period 2, the electorate rejects a representative iff its posterior belief that the rep-
resentative is congruent is less than pi.
In the disciplined equilibrium, we assume that a proportion ξ of representa-
tives are impatient, and let ξ→ 0. These impatient types will always play d1 = r,
as for them G/β(R+G)> 1, that is, the benefit G of playing d1= r outweighs the
potential benefit β(R + G) of staying in office, no matter what the probability of
reelection is after playing d1= r or d1= x. As, in the disciplined equilibrium, both
congruent and non-congruent patient types play the same way, while only impa-
tient non-congruent types deviate,
Pr(congruent|d1= a, u1) = Pr(d1= a, u1|congruent)Pr(congruent)/
[Pr(d1 = a, u1|congruent)Pr(congruent) + Pr(d1 = a,
u1|non− congruent)Pr(non− congruent)]
=
γϕ(u1− 1)pi
(1− ξ)γϕ(u1− 1)+ ξ(1− γ)ϕ(u1)
=
pi
(1− ξ)+ ξ(1− γ)ϕ(u1)/γϕ(u1− 1)
(12)
> pi iff
ϕ(u1)
ϕ(u1− 1)
6
γ
1− γ
(13)
and similarly
Pr(congruent|d1 = b, u1) =
pi
(1− ξ)+ ξγϕ(u1)/(1− γ)ϕ(u1− 1)
> pi iff
ϕ(u1)
ϕ(u1− 1)
6
1− γ
γ
. (14)
Let ub solve
ϕ(ub)
ϕ(ub − 1)
=
1− γ
γ
; similarly ua solves
ϕ(ua)
ϕ(ua − 1)
=
γ
1− γ
, hence ua= u¯ < 1/2<
ub and indeed by symmetry of ϕ, ub = − (ua − 1) = 1 − u¯ . These are the utility
cutpoints for reelection in a disciplined equilibrium after d1= b and a respectively.
Appendix: proofs of propositions 33
For a non-congruent representative to prefer not to deviate when x = a we
require
G+ β(R+G)[1−Φ(ub)] 6 β(R+G)[1−Φ(ua− 1)]
⇔κ 6 Φ(ub)−Φ(ua− 1)=Φ(1− u¯ )−Φ(u¯ − 1), (15)
and similarly when x= b, we require
κ6Φ(ua)−Φ(ub− 1)=Φ(u¯ )−Φ(− u¯ ) (16)
which is a tighter condition as u¯ < 1− u¯ .
Examining (12) and (14) shows that the probability of an incumbent’s congru-
ence goes to pi as ξ→ 0; since a new representative is also congruent with proba-
bility pi, whether a representative is reelected or ejected makes no difference to
utility in the limit. As representatives are disciplined in the first period but follow
their preferences in period 2, utility is just 1 + pi. This completes the part of the
proof relating to the disciplined equilibrium.
Turning to the moral hazard equilibrium, by Bayes’ rule,
Pr(congruent|d1, u1) =
Pr(d1, u1|congruent)pi
Pr(d1, u1|congruent)pi+Pr(d1, u1|non-cong.) (1−pi)
(17)
and
Pr(d1, u1|congruent) = Pr(d1|congruent)Pr(u1|congruent, d1)
= Pr(x= d1)Pr(u1|x= d1)
=
{
γ ϕ(u1− 1) if d1= a,
(1− γ) ϕ(u1− 1) if d1= b.
(18)
Similarly
Pr(d1, u1|non− congruent) =
{
(1− γ) ϕ(u1− 1) if d1= a,
γϕ(u1− 1) if d1= b
(19)
and thus
Pr(congruent|d1, u1)=


γϕ(u1− 1)pi
γϕ(u1− 1)pi+(1− γ)ϕ(u1)(1−pi)
ford1= a
(1− γ)ϕ(u1− 1)pi
(1− γ)ϕ(u1− 1)pi+ γϕ(u1)(1−pi)
ford1= b
(20)
where the second alternative is lower. The electorate reelects if and only if
Pr(congruent|d1, u1) > pi. Exactly as before, u¯ solves Pr(congruent|d1, u1) = pi for
u1 when d1= a, and 1− u¯ solves Pr(congruent|d1, u1)=pi when d1= b.
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For a non-congruent type to shirk, she must prefer to harm her election
prospects by choosing her own preferred action. The conditions are just the
reverse of (14) and (16), i.e. κ>Φ(1− u¯ )−Φ(u¯ − 1) when x= a and κ>Φ(u¯ )−
Φ(− u¯ ) when x= b; the former condition is tighter.
The electorate’s expected utility in this equilibrium is, as in (4):
2pi+pi(1−pi)(X − Y ) (21)
where
1−Y ≡ Pr(reelected|congruent)= γ[1−Φ(u¯ − 1)] + (1− γ)[1−Φ(− u¯ )]
⇔Y = γΦ(u¯ − 1)+ (1− γ)Φ(− u¯ ) (22)
and
X ≡ Pr(ejected|non-congruent) = γΦ(1− u¯ )+ (1− γ)Φ(u¯ ) (23)
Expected utility is thus
2pi+ pi(1−pi){γ[Φ(1− u¯ )−Φ(u¯ − 1)]+ (1− γ)[Φ(u¯ )−Φ(− u¯ )]} (24)
Finally, we examine the mixed equilibrium. Given the specified strategies, by
Bayes’ rule
Pr(congruent|d1= b, u1) =
pi(1− γ)ϕ(u1− 1)
pi(1− γ)ϕ(u1− 1)+ (1−pi)γ(1−α)ϕ(u1)
(25)
and Pr(congruent|d1= a, u1) =
piγϕ(u1− 1)
piγϕ(u1− 1)+ (1− pi)[γαϕ(u1− 1)+ (1− γ)ϕ(u1)]
. (26)
The voters reelect the incumbent iff these probabilities are at least pi: write uˆa, uˆb
for the utility cutpoints, which solve
ϕ(uˆa)
ϕ(uˆa− 1)
=
γ(1−α)
1− γ
=
ϕ(uˆb− 1)
ϕ(uˆb)
. (27)
By symmetry of ϕ, uˆb =− (uˆa − 1). For the non-congruent a-type to mix actions,
we require
G+ β(R+G)[1−Φ(uˆb)] = β(R+G)[1−Φ(uˆa− 1)]
⇔κ = Φ(uˆb)−Φ(− uˆb). (28)
Appendix: proofs of propositions 35
This equation determines uˆb, which in turn gives α in (27). Now
ϕ(uˆa)
ϕ(uˆa − 1)
=
γ(1−α)
1− γ
<
γ
1− γ
=
ϕ(u¯)
ϕ(u¯− 1)
implies uˆa > u¯ and uˆb < 1 − u¯ . (28) then shows that κ <
Φ(1− u¯ )−Φ(u¯ − 1).
The condition for the non-congruent b-type to play d1= a is
G+ β(R+G)[1−Φ(uˆa)] > β(R+G)[1−Φ(uˆb− 1)]
⇔ κ > Φ(uˆa)−Φ(− uˆa) (29)
which implies κ>Φ(u¯ )−Φ(− u¯ ).
As κ→Φ(1− u¯ )−Φ(u¯ − 1), uˆb→ 1− u¯ , hence uˆa→ u¯ and by (27) and (9) we
can see that α→ 0. As κ→ Φ(u¯ )− Φ(− u¯ ), uˆb→ u¯ and by (27) and (9) we then
have
γ(1−α)
1− γ
→
1− γ
γ
⇔ 1 − α→
(1− γ)2
γ2
; this provides a lower bound on the proba-
bility of moral hazard in the mixed equilibrium.
Voter welfare is given by
γpi{1+ [1−Φ(uˆa− 1)] +Φ(uˆa− 1)pi}
+ γ(1−pi){α(1+Φ(uˆa− 1)pi)+ (1−α)Φ(uˆb)pi}
+ (1− γ)pi{1+ [1−Φ(uˆb− 1)] +Φ(uˆb− 1)pi}
+ (1− γ)(1−pi){Φ(uˆa)pi}
(30)
which simplifies to
2pi + pi(1 − pi){γ(1 − α)[Φ(uˆb) − Φ( − uˆb)] + (1 − γ)[Φ(uˆa) − Φ( − uˆa)]} + γ(1 −
pi)α. (31)
As α→ 0, uˆa→ u¯ and this reduces to the utility of the moral hazard equilibrium
(24). 
Proposition 3. When there are n> 1 direct democratic states,
1. if and only if γ < γ¯ where γ¯ uniquely solves γ¯ =
1+Φ(− u¯)
2−Φ(u¯− 1)+Φ(− u¯)
there is a
symmetric mixed equilibrium in which all electorates choose d1 = a with
probability α ∈ [1/2, 1); for any fixed γ < γ¯, α increases towards 1 as n→
∞, and αn→
2γ − 1
γΦ(u¯− 1)+ (1− γ)Φ(− u¯)
> 0 as n→∞.
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2. otherwise, all states play d1 = a with certainty, giving expected voter utility
of γ+ γ(1−Φ(u¯ − 1))+ (1− γ)Φ(u¯ )< γ+1.
Proof. We seek a symmetric mixed equilibrium in which each electorate plays
d1 = a with probability α. Given that other electorates are playing this strategy,
each state’s electorate gets utility from playing d1= a of
γ+ γ[αn−1(1−Φ(u¯ − 1))+ (1−αn−1)] + (1− γ)[αn−1Φ(u¯ )+ (1−αn−1)] (32)
where the terms in square brackets represent the probability of staying with a
when x= a and changing when x= b respectively, and u¯ is defined as in Proposi-
tion 1 to be the belief cutpoint after choosing d1 = a. Similarly, each state gets
utility from playing d1= b of
(1− γ) + (1− γ)[1− (1− α)n−1+ (1− α)n−1(1− Φ(ub − 1))] + γ[1− (1− α)
n−1+
(1−α)n−1Φ(ub)] (33)
where ub = 1 − u¯ is the belief cutpoint after choosing d1 = b which solves ϕ(ub)/
ϕ(ub− ) = (1− γ)/γ, and (1− α)
n−1 is the probability of all other states choosing
b. Mixing requires that (32) and (33) are equal: we simplify both sides, using 1 −
Φ(u¯ )=Φ(− u¯ ) and 1−Φ(ub)=Φ(u¯ − 1), to get
γ + 1− αn−1[γΦ(u¯ − 1) + (1− γ)Φ(−
u¯ )] = (1 − γ) + 1 − (1 − α)n−1[γΦ(u¯ − 1) +
(1− γ)Φ(− u¯ )]
⇔ 2γ − 1 = [αn−1 − (1 − α)n−1][γΦ(u¯ − 1) + (1 −
γ)Φ(− u¯ )]
⇔αn−1− (1−α)n−1 =
2γ − 1
γΦ(u¯ − 1)+ (1− γ)Φ(− u¯ )
. (34)
As the left hand side is less than 1 for α < 1, there is a non-degenerate mixed
equilibrium if and only if
2γ − 1 < γΦ(u¯ − 1)+ (1− γ)Φ(− u¯ ) (35)
⇔ γ <
1+Φ(− u¯ )
2−Φ(u¯ − 1)+Φ(− u¯ )
; (36)
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otherwise (33) is always strictly less than (32), as can be seen by taking α → 1.
The derivative of the right hand side of (35) with respect to γ, recalling that u¯
depends on γ, is
Φ(u¯ − 1)−Φ(− u¯ )+ γ
d
dγ
Φ(u¯ − 1)+ (1− γ)
d
dγ
Φ(− u¯ )
= Φ(u¯ − 1)−Φ(− u¯ )+ γϕ(u¯ − 1)
du¯
dγ
+(1− γ)ϕ(− u¯ )
(
−
du¯
dγ
)
= Φ(u¯ − 1)−Φ(− u¯ )+ (1− γ)ϕ(u¯ )
du¯
dγ
− (1− γ)ϕ(u¯ )
du¯
dγ
,
where we use that ϕ(u¯ )= ϕ(− u¯ ) and ϕ(u¯ )/ϕ(u¯ − 1)= γ/(1− γ),
= Φ(u¯ − 1)−Φ(− u¯ ) (37)
< 0 as u¯ < 1/2.
On the other hand, the derivative of the left hand side of (35) with respect to γ is
positive. Thus there is a unique cutpoint γ¯ solving (35) with equality, and we
have a mixed strategy equilibrium for γ < γ¯ and a pure strategy equilibrium for
γ > γ¯ . When γ > γ¯ , all states play d1 = a, and therefore voters gain no more
information than in the case of a single direct democracy: thus all voters update
identically after period 1, using the same cutpoint u¯ as in Proposition 1, and
expected utility is γ+ γ(1−Φ(u¯ − 1))+ (1− γ)Φ(u¯ ) just as before.
Finally, examining (34) as n → ∞, because the right hand side is constant
with respect to n, αn−1 − (1 − α)n−1 remains so too. This and α > 1/2 require
that α increase with n. Indeed, α→ 1 as n→∞. For suppose α is bounded above
by K < 1. Then for m > n, αm−1 − (1 − α)m−1 < Km−nαn−1 − (1 − K)m−n(1 −
α)n−1 and as m → ∞ this goes to 0, contradicting the fact that the right hand
side of (34) is positive. As α is increasing and not bounded by K < 1 it must be
that it approaches 1. Therefore as n→∞, 1− α→ 0 and (1− α)n−1< 1− α also
goes to 0. Thus, αn−1− (1− α)n−1→ αn−1. Thus αn−1 approaches the right hand
side of (34), and αn does the same. 
Proposition 6. 1. For κ < Φ(u¯ ) and any γ > γ¯, there is some pi such that nei-
ther a system of representative democracies nor a system of direct democracies is
stable.
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2. For κ > 1 and any γ > γ¯, there is some pi such that when n is large enough,
neither a system of n representative democracies nor a system of n direct democ-
racies is stable.
Proof. By Proposition 4, if κ 6 1 then 2 or more representative democracies can
achieve voter utility of 1 + pi in a disciplined equilibrium, and if κ > 1 and n→∞
then representative democracies achieve voter utility approaching 2pi+ pi(1− pi) in
a moral hazard equilibrium. In either case, as n→ ∞, a single direct democracy
among n − 1 representative democracies will achieve utility approaching 1 + γ
(Proposition 5). So for a system of representative democracies to be stable it is
necessary that
1+ pi> 1+ γ for κ6 1; or (38)
2pi+pi(1−pi)> 1+ γ for κ> 1. (39)
If one of these conditions is violated, then (for high enough n, when κ > 1) a
system of n representative democracies will be “invaded”, in the evolutionary
sense, by a single direct democracy.
From Proposition 3, if γ > γ¯ , then in a system of n direct democracies, all
electorates choose d1= a and achieve utility of γ + γ(1−Φ(u¯ − 1)) + (1− γ)Φ(u¯ ).
The condition for stability of a direct democratic federation is thus
γ[2−Φ(u¯ − 1)]+ (1− γ)Φ(u¯ )>U ′ (40)
where U ′ stands for the utility achieved by a single representative democracy, say
state 1, with n− 1 direct democratic neighbours.
First, suppose the representative in state 1 is disciplined. Then the direct
democracies will all choose d1
j = a, j ∈ {2,  , n}, and follow the representative
democracy in period 2. To analyse the conditions for this equilibrium we assume
that a small proportion ξ of representatives are impatient. If the electorate
observes d1
1= b and u1
1<u1
2, given equilibrium strategies it will infer that its repre-
sentative is impatient and non-congruent, and eject him. Observing d1
1 = b and
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u1
1> u1
2 will give a posterior probability just above pi (due to the small proportion
of impatient, congruent representatives) and the electorate will reelect.
If d1
1= a then by Bayes’ rule
Pr(congruent|d1
1= a, u1
1)=
piϕ(u1
1− 1)γ
piϕ(u1
1− 1)γ+ (1−pi){ϕ(u1
1− 1)γ(1− ξ)+ ϕ(u1
1)(1− γ)ξ}
(41)
where the two terms in curly brackets reflect the probabilities of patient and
impatient non-congruent representatives. The condition for this to equal pi is
pi =
piϕ(u1
1− 1)γ
piϕ(u1
1− 1)γ+(1−pi){ϕ(u1
1− 1)γ(1− ξ)+ ϕ(u1
1)(1− γ)ξ}
⇔ ϕ(u1
1− 1)γ = piϕ(u1
1− 1)γ+(1−pi){ϕ(u1
1− 1)γ(1− ξ)+ ϕ(u1
1)(1− γ)ξ}
⇔ ϕ(u1
1− 1)γ = ϕ(u1
1− 1)γ(1− ξ)+ ϕ(u1
1)(1− γ)ξ
⇔
ϕ(u1
1)
ϕ(u1
1− 1)
=
γ
1− γ
⇔u1
1 = u¯ (42)
, so u¯ is the state 1 electorate’s cutpoint for reelection when d1
1 = a. Conditions
for discipline when x= a and when x= b are therefore
G6 β(R+G)[1−Φ(u¯ − 1)]⇔κ6Φ(1− u¯ ) (43)
and
G+ β(R+G)[1−Φ(u¯ )]6 β(R+G)⇔κ6Φ(u¯ ) (44)
respectively, reflecting the certainty of reelection (ejection) from choosing d1
1= b=
x (d1
1 = b  x). The latter condition is tighter, as u¯ < 1 − u¯ . Thus, if κ 6 Φ(u¯ ),
there is a disciplined equilibrium and U ′ = 1 + pi. Writing γ[2 − Φ(u¯ − 1)] + (1 −
γ)Φ(u¯ ) = γ + γΦ(1− u¯ ) + (1− γ)Φ(u¯ ), and 1 + γ = γ + γ + (1− γ), we see that
when γ> γ¯ and
γ+ γΦ(1− u¯ )+ (1− γ)Φ(u¯ )< 1+pi < γ+ γ+(1− γ), (45)
(40) and (38) will simultaneously be violated. Clearly for any γ > γ¯ there will be
values of pi satisfying this pair of inequalities. In these cases only a mixed federa-
tion of direct and representative democracies can be stable. This proves part 1.
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If κ > 1 then a single representative democracy will always be in a moral
hazard equilibrium. The extra information provided by the single representative
state provides an added incentive for its direct democratic neighbours to follow
their prior; they would do so anyway as γ > γ¯ . So d1
j = a, for j = 2,  , n. There-
fore, a non-congruent a-type who plays d1
1 = b is detected with certainty, as is a
congruent b-type who plays d1
1 = b. A representative who plays d1
1 = a may be
ejected if u1
1 is too low; the presence of direct democratic neighbours gives no
extra information in this case and so the utility cutpoint for ejection is just the
same as in the unitary case: u¯ solving (20) when d1 = a. Expected utility when
x= a is thus
pi[1+ (1−Φ(u¯ − 1))+piΦ(u¯ − 1)]+ (1−pi)pi (46)
where the first term inside the square brackets is period 1 utility from a congruent
representative, the second is period 2 utility if the congruent incumbent is
reelected and the third term is period 2 utility if the congruent incumbent is
replaced; and the final term outside the square brackets represents expected
period 2 utility after a non-congruent incumbent is certainly replaced. Expected
utility when x= b is 2pi+(1−pi)piΦ(u¯ ) by similar logic, and so
U ′ = γ{pi[1 + (1 − Φ(u¯ − 1)) + piΦ(u¯ − 1)] + (1 − pi)pi} + (1 − γ){2pi + (1 −
pi)piΦ(u¯ )}
= pi{γ[1+ (1−Φ(u¯ − 1))+piΦ(u¯ − 1)+ (1−pi)] + (1− γ)[2+ (1−pi)Φ(u¯ )]}
= pi{2− γ(1−pi)Φ(u¯ − 1)+ (1− γ)(1−pi)Φ(u¯ )}
= 2pi+ pi(1−pi)[γΦ(1− u¯ )+ (1− γ)Φ(u¯ )]. (47)
Thus (40) will be violated iff
2pi+ pi(1−pi)[γΦ(1− u¯ )+ (1− γ)Φ(u¯ )] > γ[2−Φ(u¯ − 1)] + (1− γ)Φ(u¯ )
= γ+ γΦ(1− u¯ )+ (1− γ)Φ(u¯ )
⇔ 2pi+ [pi(1−pi)− 1][γΦ(1− u¯ )+ (1− γ)Φ(u¯ )] > γ
⇔ 2pi+ pi(1−pi)[γΦ(1− u¯ )+ (1− γ)Φ(u¯ )]
+ 1− [γΦ(1− u¯ )+ (1− γ)Φ(u¯ )] > 1+ γ (48)
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and so (39) and (40) will simultaneously be violated iff
2pi+ pi(1− pi)[γΦ(1− u¯ ) + (1− γ)Φ(u¯ )] + 1− [γΦ(1− u¯ ) + (1− γ)Φ(u¯ )]> 1+ γ >
2pi+pi(1−pi). (49)
For any γ, we can choose pi so that 2pi + pi(1 − pi) approaches 1 + γ from below,
thus ensuring the second inequality in the chain; it remains to prove that
2pi+ pi(1−pi)[γΦ(1− u¯ )+ (1− γ)Φ(u¯ )]
+ 1− [γΦ(1− u¯ )+ (1− γ)Φ(u¯ )] > 2pi+pi(1−pi)
⇔pi(1−pi)[γΦ(1− u¯ )+ (1− γ)Φ(u¯ )]
+ 1− [γΦ(1− u¯ )+ (1− γ)Φ(u¯ )] > pi(1−pi)
⇔ 1− [γΦ(1− u¯ )+ (1− γ)Φ(u¯ )] > pi(1−pi){1−
[γΦ(1− u¯ )+ (1− γ)Φ(u¯ )]}
⇔ 1 > pi(1−pi) (50)
which is always the case.
Thus for κ > 1 and any γ, when 2pi + pi(1 − pi) is close enough to 1 + γ, but
below it, (39) and (40) are violated and for high enough n neither a system of n
representative democracies nor one of n direct democracies is stable. This proves
part 2. 
Remark. For values of κ between Φ(u¯ ) and 1, and some values of γ, it may be
that one of the two systems is stable whatever the value of pi. For example, sup-
pose κ= 1. Then as a system of representative democracies will have a disciplined
equilibrium, it will be stable if (38) is satisfied. A single RD will have a moral
hazard equilibrium: a non-congruent a-type will be ejected if she chooses d1
1 = b,
but may not be reelected if she chooses d1
1 = a, and so will prefer the former; a
non-congruent b-type will be reelected for sure if she chooses d1
1 = b but may get
away with choosing d1
1 = a, and so will prefer the latter. The voters’ expected
utility will be (47) as before. Therefore (38) and (40) are violated, by analogy
with (49), if and only if
2pi+ pi(1− pi)[γΦ(1− u¯ ) + (1− γ)Φ(u¯ )] + 1− [γΦ(1− u¯ ) + (1− γ)Φ(u¯ )]> 1+ γ >
1+ pi (51)
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The left hand side is increasing in pi and so both inequalities will hold simultane-
ously if and only if they hold when piրγ, thus iff
2γ + γ(1 − γ)[γΦ(1 − u¯ ) + (1 − γ)Φ(u¯ )] + 1 − [γΦ(1 − u¯ ) + (1 −
γ)Φ(u¯ )] > 1+ γ
⇔ γ+ [γ(1− γ)− 1][γΦ(1− u¯ )+ (1− γ)Φ(u¯ )] > 0 (52)
Suppose that the voters’ utility signal becomes very accurate, so Φ(ε)→ 1 for ε >
0. Then if u¯ ∈ (0, 1/2), the left hand side above approaches γ + [γ(1 − γ) − 1] =
2γ − γ2− 1=− (1− γ)2 and thus cannot be positive. And when the voters’ utility
signal is very accurate, u¯ will indeed be close to 1/2 as e.g. u¯ a little larger than
1/2 will provide very good evidence that the right policy was chosen. For
example, if ε is normally distributed with variance σ2 then simple algebra from
the pdf shows that u¯ = 1/2 − σ2 log(γ/(1 − γ)) which will be positive for low
enough σ2. Thus when the voters’ signal is accurate enough, there is no way for
(38) and (40) to be violated simultaneously.
Nevertheless, there will also be cases when (52) holds: for example if ε is nor-
mally distributed and σ2 is large then (52) approaches γ + [γ(1 − γ) − 1][γ] =
γ2(1 − γ) > 0. So there are cases in which only a mixed system of RDs and DDs
will be stable, but no simple general rule.
Proposition 9. If κ > 1 and n is large, and γ > γ¯ as defined in Proposition 3;
then
1. when 2pi + pi(1− pi)> 1 + γ then a system of all representative democracies
is stable and maximizes voter welfare;
2. when 2pi + pi(1− pi) < 1 + γ then in general the equilibrium number of rep-
resentative democracies is smaller than the welfare-maximizing number of
representative democracies.
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Proof. By (7) we can see that if 2pi+ pi(1− pi)> 1 + γ then for n large enough, it
will be best to have an all-representative federation, and this federation will be
stable as any RD would lose utility by switching to a DD. This proves part 1.
Suppose that there are m < n RDs and n − m DDs. As γ > γ¯ all DDs will
choose d1= a: the possibility that one of the RDs will choose b and do their exper-
imenting for them only increases the incentive to choose a so the argument from
Proposition 3 applies a fortiori . As κ > 1 all non-congruent representatives shirk.
Thus when x= a, the probability that all states choose d1= a is pi
m, and when x=
b, the probability that all states choose d1 = a is (1 − pi)
m; otherwise at least one
state chooses d1= b.
Expected voter utility in an RD is
γ{pi[2− (1− pi)Pr(ejected|d1= a= x)] + (1− pi)piPr(ejected|d1= b x)}+ (1−
γ){pi[2− (1−pi)Pr(ejected|d1= b= x)]+ (1−pi)piPr(ejected|d1= a x)}
= γ{pi[2 − (1 − pi)Pr(ejected|d1 = a = x)] + (1 − pi)pi} + (1 − γ){2pi + (1 −
pi)piPr(ejected|d1= a x)} (53)
as playing b results in the electorate learning the representative’s congruence with
certainty. Let ua(m) be the cutpoint for reelection when all states, including m
RDs, choose d1= a.
Pr(ejected|d1= a=x) = pi
m−1Φ(ua(m)− 1) (54)
Pr(ejected|d1= a x) = (1−pi)
m−1Φ(ua(m))+ (1− (1− pi)
m−1) (55)
= 1− (1−pi)m−1Φ(−ua(m))
as when at least one state from the remaining m− 1 RDs chooses d1= b, the elec-
torate learns the representative’s congruence with certainty. Plugging these into
(53) gives expected voter utility in an RD of
URD(m) = γ{pi[2 − (1 − pi)pi
m−1Φ(ua(m) − 1)] + (1 − pi)pi} + (1 − γ){2pi + (1 −
pi)pi[1− (1−pi)m−1Φ(−ua(m))]}
= 2pi + pi(1 − pi) − γ(1 − pi)pimΦ(ua(m) − 1) − (1 − γ)pi(1 − pi)
mΦ( −
ua(m)). (56)
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Expected voter utility in a DD is
UDD(m) = γ + γ(1− pi
m) + γpim[1−Φ(uˆa(m)− 1)] + (1− γ)(1− (1− pi)
m) + (1−
γ)(1−pi)mΦ(uˆa(m))
= γ+1− γpimΦ(uˆa(m)− 1)− (1− γ)(1−pi)
mΦ(− uˆa(m)) (57)
where uˆa(m) gives the voters’ cutpoint for choosing d2 = a when all states,
including m representative democracies, choose d1= a.
Differentiating UDD with respect to m, we note that
d
dm
UDD=
∂
∂m
UDD+
∂
∂uˆa
UDD ·
d uˆa
dm
(58)
and as uˆa is the welfare-maximizing choice, we can apply the envelope theorem to
conclude
d
dm
UDD =
∂
∂m
UDD = − γpi
m (ln pi) Φ(uˆa(m) − 1) − (1 − γ)(1 − pi)
m(ln(1 − pi))Φ( −
uˆa(m))> 0. (59)
Similarly,
d
dm
URD =
∂
∂m
URD = − γ(1 − pi)pi
mΦ(ua(m) − 1) ln pi − (1 − γ)pi(1 − pi)
mΦ( −
ua(m)) ln(1−pi)> 0. (60)
Expected average utility is
m
n
URD(m)+
n−m
n
UDD(m). (61)
Let m∗ be the number of RDs that maximizes this. I show that m∗> mˆ.
To be in equilibrium, mˆ must satisfy
UDD(mˆ)−URD(mˆ +1) > 0
URD(mˆ)−UDD(mˆ − 1) > 0 (62)
so that no state wishes to change systems. Write ∆(m) =UDD(m)−URD(m+1). I
next show ∆(m) is increasing.
d
dm
∆(m) = UDD
′ (m)−URD
′ (m+1)
= − γpim (lnpi)Φ(uˆa(m)− 1)− (1− γ)(1−pi)
m(ln(1−pi))Φ(− uˆa(m))
− { − γ(1 − pi)pimΦ(ua(m + 1) − 1) ln pi − (1 − γ)pi(1 − pi)
mΦ( −
ua(m+1)) ln(1−pi)}
= − γpim(lnpi)[Φ(uˆa(m)− 1)− (1−pi)Φ(ua(m+1)− 1)]
− (1− γ)(1−pi)m(ln(1−pi))[Φ(− uˆa(m))−piΦ(−ua(m+1))] (63)
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Now, the RD reelection cutpoint ua(m) solves
pi = Pr(x= a|ua, d1
i = a∀i)
=
ϕ(ua− 1)pimγ
ϕ(ua− 1)pimγ+ ϕ(ua)(1− pi)m(1− γ)
⇔
ϕ(ua)
ϕ(ua− 1)
=
γ
1− γ
pim−1
(1−pi)m−1
(64)
while the DD cutpoint for choosing a, uˆa(m), solves
1
2
= Pr(x= a|uˆa, d1
i = a∀i)
=
ϕ(uˆa− 1)pimγ
ϕ(uˆa− 1)pimγ+ ϕ(uˆa)(1− pi)m(1− γ)
⇔
ϕ(uˆa)
ϕ(uˆa− 1)
=
γ
1− γ
pim
(1−pi)m
. (65)
Comparing these results shows that uˆa(m)= ua(m+1). Plugging this identity into
(63) shows that ∆(m) is increasing.
(62) shows ∆(mˆ − 1) 6 0. As ∆(m) is increasing, ∆(m) 6 0 for m 6 mˆ − 1.
Suppose m∗6 mˆ − 1. Now average utility at m∗ is at least as high as at m∗+1:
m∗
n
URD(m
∗)+
n−m∗
n
UDD(m
∗) >
m∗+1
n
URD(m
∗+1)+
n−m∗− 1
n
UDD(m
∗+1)
or, rearranging:
m∗
n
[URD(m
∗)−URD(m
∗+1)]+
n−m∗
n
[UDD(m
∗)−UDD(m
∗+1)] +
1
n
[UDD(m
∗+1)−
URD(m
∗+1)]> 0
and since the first two terms are negative, by state utility increasing in m, it must
be that
UDD(m
∗+1)−URD(m
∗+1)> 0, (66)
hence, again by utility increasing in m,
UDD(m
∗+1)−URD(m
∗)> 0. (67)
But
∆(m∗)=UDD(m
∗)−URD(m
∗+1)6 0 (68)
by m∗6 mˆ − 1. Deducting these gives
[UDD(m
∗)−UDD(m
∗+1)]+ [URD(m
∗)−URD(m
∗+1)]< 0, (69)
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a contradiction by utility increasing in m. Thus m∗> mˆ.
It is possible that m∗ = mˆ for n small. In general, however, we would expect
mˆ > m∗ for large values of n. This can be seen intuitively by looking at the con-
tinuous equivalents of our optimality and equilibrium conditions. For optimality,
the FOC is
m
n
URD
′ (m∗)+
n−m∗
n
UDD
′ (m∗)+
1
n
[URD(m
∗)−UDD(m
∗)] = 0 (70)
and as the first two terms are positive, the last term must be negative; but if so a
representative democracy at m∗ will have an incentive to switch to a direct
democracy. 
Notes
1. I use “states” throughout to refer indifferently to political units with policy-
making power. These could be nation-states or regional sub-units such as
Swiss cantons.
2. The conclusion suggests a mechanism by which direct democracies may
have a larger impact on their neighbours.
3. Adding a discount rate for voters would alter decisions only in a direct
democracy, as in a representative democracy the voters never make a deci-
sion before the end of period 1. The main change would be a greater incen-
tive to choose d1= a when there are many DD states (Section 4.3).
4. For γ < γ¯ , there are also n pure strategy equilibria in which one state
chooses d1 = b and all others choose d1 = a. The proof is simple and avail-
able on request.
5. Weakening this assumption would not affect the limiting result in Proposi-
tion 4 as n → ∞, so long as representatives’ congruence is not perfectly
correlated among all the states.
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6. The same is true if pi is high. For example if pi = 0.95, 1 − 0.9520 − (1 −
0.95)20 @ 0.6, so even with 20 states shirking will only be detected 60% of
the time.
7. I do not look for a mixed equilibrium of constitutional choice, as I do in
the case of policy choice, because it is hard to interpret a mixed strategy
profile within the historical interpretation of equilibrium.
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